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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly fifty years ago, the federal government of the United States of
America passed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to promote the
protection of constitutional rights and provide relief against discrimination.1
Twenty-five years later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
established a burden-shifting framework that allowed an employer to defend
particular actions that may have involved discrimination in Title VII claims.2
Congress addressed the Court’s burden-shifting framework two years later in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by specifically identifying a restriction against
mixed-motive discrimination3 and the resultant responsibility of an employer
to defend such questionable employment practices.4
In University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, the
Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
activities relating to the facilitation of anti-discrimination enforcement.5 This
case is important because it creates a higher burden of proof for a plaintiff in
a Title VII retaliation case.6
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in Nassar
misinterpreted the legislative action implemented in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 in order to adopt the but-for causation standard supported in the
dissenting opinion from Price Waterhouse. This interpretation imposes the
burden upon a plaintiff of establishing but-for causation regarding the
discriminatory motives of an employer in Title VII retaliation claims. 7
*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Garth Flygare is a J.D./M.B.A. candidate specializing in business and transactional law at Southern
Illinois University School of Law and College of Business. He is expecting to receive his degree
in May of 2015. He would like to thank his family for their support throughout the writing process.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964).
490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2013).
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–31 (2013).
Id. at 2533.
Id.

557

558

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

Additionally, the Supreme Court inappropriately based its deviation from the
Price Waterhouse precedent on the similarity among provisions of Title VII
and the unrelated Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),8
despite previously recognizing the clear intentions of Congress to treat the
statutory schemes in a different manner.9
The resultant framework of the Nassar decision creates a paradoxical
employment environment regarding discrimination. Previous legislation and
court rulings served to protect employees from mixed-motive adverse
employment decisions up to the point of making a discrimination complaint,
while the Nassar decision, based on precedent related to a separate statutory
scheme, cuts that protection short and insulates an employer from liability
for actions after an employee initially complains.10
II. BACKGROUND
In order to fully appreciate the impact of Nassar on Title VII claims, it
is necessary to examine the decision in Price Waterhouse that established a
burden-shifting framework and the subsequent legislation in the aftermath of
that case. Additionally, the decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc.11 is important to understand the path deviating the Court away from
Price Waterhouse and the basis for the Nassar decision.
This Note will first examine the decision in Price Waterhouse and its
impact on Title VII discrimination claims. Then, this Note will examine the
codification of Price Waterhouse in the Civil Right Act of 1991. Next, this
Note will discuss the Court’s decision in Gross, when the Court deviated
from the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework for ADEA claims.
Finally, this Note will examine how the Court used Gross to extend the
ADEA framework back to Title VII retaliation claims in Nassar.
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff, Ms. Hopkins brought a Title VII sex
discrimination suit against her employers alleging that she was denied
partnership in the Price Waterhouse accounting firm based on the
partnership’s use of gender stereotypes in its promotional decisions.12 Ms.
Hopkins was a senior manager and a candidate for partnership at Price
Waterhouse.13 She had worked at Price Waterhouse for five years and was
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instrumental in acquiring a contract in excess of twenty-five million dollars
with the Department of State.14
Despite Ms. Hopkins’s qualifications, the record demonstrated that
there were issues with her “interpersonal skills.”15 However, it was also clear
that Ms. Hopkins did not fulfill the gender role that some members of the
partnership expected of her.16 Expectations of lady-like behavior were
evident, and the record indicated some members of the partnership even
advised her to correct her unfeminine behavior.17 Additionally, at least one
member of the partnership had a history of discrimination against female
candidates for partnership, and the other members had taken no action to
correct his behavior.18 This member was even allowed to continue
submitting his opinion on further candidates.19
The lower court found there to be both legitimate and discriminatory
issues involved in the evaluation of Ms. Hopkins’s candidacy for partnership,
and it held Price Waterhouse was liable for its behavior.20 It also held that
Price Waterhouse could have defeated liability for equitable relief if it had
shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have come to the same
decision even if the discriminatory motivation was removed from its
decision.21 However, as the decision against Ms. Hopkins’s promotion was
clouded with so many indications of discriminatory motives, Price
Waterhouse could not demonstrate a motivation that was sufficiently
independent of discrimination.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the requisite burden of
proof for the plaintiff and the defendant in a Title VII suit.23 A major dividing
line in the Court’s decision related to whether the statutory scheme
necessitated but-for causation in order for a plaintiff to prevail. Where the
plurality came together was on the agreement that the burden of proof for a
defendant was by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to clear and
convincing evidence.24
The majority opinion of the Court identified that, in other incidents
where clear and convincing evidence is necessary, it is required of a plaintiff
and acts as a protection for a defendant.25 An exception to this, and another
instance requiring clear and convincing evidence, was in the situation where
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a federal agency wished to show a plaintiff in a Title VII claim was not
entitled to relief.26 The Court differentiated that instance from the facts of
Price Waterhouse, as the prior case involved a situation related to damages
after initial liability was determined, and the case at hand dealt with the initial
determination of liability.27
Justice O’Connor made the argument in her concurring opinion that a
burden-shifting framework is common in a number of judicial areas, as there
is only a certain extent to which a plaintiff can go in establishing a prima
facie case.28 In the setting of a Title VII claim, after an employee has
demonstrated a prima facie case, it is appropriate for the burden to shift to
the defendant, because there is no longer a good faith presumption.29 The
situation would not exist absent the employer’s allowance of discriminatory
motives intermingled with legitimate motives.30
On the issue of but-for causation, the majority opinion addressed the
paradoxical burden the dissent would impose on a plaintiff in a Title VII
claim involving mixed-motives.31 Basically, if two forces are at play, and it
is unknown whether one or both of the forces is the but-for cause,
determining the but-for cause would not be possible.32 It cannot be the case
that there is no cause.33
In the concurrence, Justice O’Connor did not agree on the metaphysical
contemplations, but instead advocated a position that deemed a higher burden
of proof for the plaintiff as unreasonable for practical standards of
accessibility to the facts.34 A plaintiff can only show that discrimination was
involved to a substantial degree but cannot “pinpoint discrimination as the
precise cause of her injury.”35
The dissent took a position favoring strict but-for causation.36 The
dissent believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was “not concerned with
the mere presence of impermissible motives.”37 Rather, the Act is only
“directed to employment decisions that result from these motives.”38
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B. Civil Rights Act of 1991
Two years after the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 in order to, among other things, “respond to recent
decisions by the Supreme Court” and to “provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination.”39 The law added §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e5(b)(2).40 In § 2000e-2(m), the law codified the restriction against mixedmotive discrimination actions by employers.41 In § 2000e-5(b)(2), the law
codified the effects of the burden-shifting framework, placing the burden on
the defendant after the plaintiff establishes an initial prima facie case.42
C. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
In Gross, the fifty-four-year-old plaintiff alleged age discrimination
after his employer reallocated his duties partially to another employee in her
early forties.43 The plaintiff filed suit, alleging violations of the ADEA.44
The plaintiff prevailed in the district court, but the decision was
appealed based on a questionable jury instruction related to the requisite
burden of proof.45 The district court required only a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in
the employment decision before the burden shifted to the defendant, but on
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the burdenshifting framework from Price Waterhouse controlled ADEA claims.46
Under that framework, the plaintiff must show direct evidence of
discrimination, as opposed to a showing by a preponderance of the evidence,
before the burden shifts to the defendant.47
The Supreme Court overturned the circuit court, ruling that Price
Waterhouse was not controlling on ADEA claims.48 The Court identified
ADEA claims and Title VII claims as controlled by different statutory
schemes and necessarily subject to different rules.49
The Court went on to note that Congress did not similarly amend the
ADEA after the Price Waterhouse decision as it had amended Title VII
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991.50 The Court equated this legislative
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inaction as an intention to exclude ADEA claims from the Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting framework.51
Absent the applicability of Price Waterhouse, the Court looked to the
ADEA to provide a standard that could defeat the Court’s presumptive
application of but-for causation.52 The Court held that no such provision was
present, and ruled that “the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to
establish . . . the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”53
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the
Supreme Court saw another Title VII case involving mixed-motives, but this
time in the form of a discrimination-based retaliation claim.54 The Court
came to a different decision in Nassar than it did in Price Waterhouse.55 The
Court adopted the but-for requirement present in the Price Waterhouse
dissent and later in the Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. ADEA case.56
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
The plaintiff, Dr. Naiel Nassar, was a faculty member of middle-eastern
descent at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW)
from 1995-2006 (except for a brief time when he pursued further
education).57 He was also a physician with Parkland Hospital due to an
affiliation between the university and the hospital.58 The affiliation required
Parkland Hospital “to offer empty staff physician posts to the University’s
faculty members . . . and, accordingly, most of the staff physician positions
at the [h]ospital [we]re filled by those faculty members.”59
In 2004, UTSW hired Dr. Beth Levine who became Dr. Nassar’s
supervisor.60 Witnesses claim Levine made racist comments, calling middleeasterners lazy, opposing the hiring of middle-easterners, and complaining
when middle-easterners were hired.61 Additionally, it was alleged that she

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 177.
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013).
Id. at 2534.
Id. at 2523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2523, 2536.

2015]

Casenote

563

unduly scrutinized the work of Dr. Nassar.62 Dr. Nassar filed complaints with
Levine’s supervisor, Dr. Gregory Fitz, but Dr. Fitz failed to take any action.63
After preliminary negotiations to stay on with Parkland Hospital, Dr.
Nassar resigned from his position at UTSW and sent a letter to multiple
recipients explaining his decision was based on the harassment from
Levine.64 In response to the letter, a witness heard Fitz state that it was
publicly humiliating for Levine and that she should be “publicly
exonerated.”65
Fitz made it known he opposed Parkland Hospital’s decision to hire Dr.
Nassar, and soon after, Parkland Hospital withdrew from employment
negotiations.66 After the withdrawal, Dr. Nassar filed a Title VII suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging religious and
racially-motivated harassment resulting in his constructive discharge.67 He
filed a second claim under § 2000e-3(a), alleging that the efforts to prevent
his employment with the hospital were retaliatory actions in response to his
complaints about harassment.68
Dr. Nassar prevailed in the District Court, which awarded $400,000 in
back-pay and $300,000 in compensatory damages.69 However, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the discrimination verdict and left the
judgment for retaliatory discharge intact.70 Certiorari was granted in order to
determine the appropriate standard of causation for retaliation claims under
Title VII.71
B. Majority Opinion
There are four main points set out in the majority opinion. The first
deals with the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).72 The second argument
equates the word “because” with “but-for” causation.73 The third argument
is an efficiency-based argument, stating that without but-for causation, it is
too difficult to weed out frivolous claims at an early stage. 74 The fourth
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argument simply explains why the Court should not give deference to the
EEOC.75
The first argument of the majority opinion identifies the language of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) as the source of a lessened burden of proof.76 Congress
added this section in response to the decision in Price Waterhouse to clarify
its intention.77 However, the placement and wording of the provision
seemingly does not relate to retaliation, in the Court’s opinion, because
specific types of discrimination are listed after the identification of the
lessened standard of proof, and retaliation claims are not included in the list.78
The second argument simply looks to precedent regarding the word
“because.”79 The Court held that if something happens “because of” another
thing, then that other thing is the “reason” for it.80 Therefore, that other thing
is the “but-for” cause.81 This argument existed in the dissent of Price
Waterhouse,82 and reappeared in Gross (relating to the ADEA),83 and the
Court found it instructive in Nassar.84
The third argument discusses the inefficiency that would arise out of a
lessened burden of proof for retaliation charges.85 The Court found that
retaliation charges filed with the EEOC have the second highest
discrimination claim rate after those based on race.86 The Court stated that
ensuring a higher burden of proof would help the court system free up
resources and dismiss frivolous claims earlier in the litigation process.87
The final argument identifies the EEOC guidelines as undeserving of
deference.88 The standard set out in Skidmore v. Swift states deference to an
agency depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”89 In
the end, the criticism is that the agency failed to address specific details and
the agency’s discussion is far too generic to provide any forceful
persuasion.90
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C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent addressed each of the majority’s arguments in turn. In
regard to the majority’s argument about legislative intent and the placement
of § 2000e-2(m), the dissent pointed out the majority’s willful disregard for
the House Report for 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).91 Congress’s intent was to
lessen the burden of proof and to ensure the recognition of discrimination as
unlawful, even in a case in which it is only one of the motivating factors in
an adverse employment action.92 Congress was trying to strengthen the law
against discrimination, and it would make little sense if its action was
interpreted to be limited only to specific acts, while weakening the law in
regard to retaliation.93
The dissent also argued that retaliation is in fact a type of discrimination
that is listed in the affected parts of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).94 Although it
may not be listed specifically, when someone is retaliated against after filing
a complaint for racial discrimination, any retaliation on that individual is a
manifestation of racial discrimination.95
Additionally, the dissent identified the EEOC’s immediate reference to
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).96 The fact that retaliation was not
specifically listed as being subject to the lessened burden of proof did not
change the way that retaliation claims had always been handled.97 The failure
to list retaliation in the provision would not mean that a type of discrimination
would go unpunished.98
The dissent also identified the meaning of “because” in the context of a
mixed-motive decision, just as the majority held in Price Waterhouse.99
III. ANALYSIS
The majority decision in Nassar, allowing mixed-motives in retaliatory
employment actions, was inappropriate. Part A of this Section discusses why
Nassar should have been decided differently, based on precedent, legislative
history, policy, and statutory provisions. Part B discusses the implications
of the Nassar decision in creating inconsistencies and an impractical
framework for Title VII claims.
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A. The Decision in Nassar Was Inappropriate Because It Ignored Title VII
History
Price Waterhouse controlled status-based Title VII discrimination and
retaliation claims in the time between the Court’s decision in that case and
Nassar,100 and prior to Gross, the Price Waterhouse framework was even
extended to discrimination claims under other statutory schemes.101 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the ruling in Price Waterhouse by
expressly restricting status-based adverse employment practices.102 The
Price Waterhouse decision’s major contribution to discrimination suits was
the causation analysis it provided.
In Gross, the Court avoided applying the same causation to ADEA
claims as Price Waterhouse, because ADEA claims and Title VII claims are
governed by different statutory schemes.103 However, the Court’s opinion in
Nassar, authored and joined by the same Justices as in Gross, avoided the
causation framework from Price Waterhouse and instead compared the
“because” language in Title VII to the “because” language in the ADEA.104
In the first instance, the Court refused to compare similar language
because of different statutory schemes,105 while in the second instance the
Court refused to differentiate statutory schemes because of similar
language.106 One would generally call similar methods of justification
circular, but circularity is, in the very least, redeemable through its internal
logical consistency. In this case, the Court is only consistent in its selective
adoption of contradictory arguments to achieve a discernible goal.
When the Court ruled in Price Waterhouse, there was relative clarity
regarding the meaning of “because” in Title VII. 107 The legislature
subsequently codified restrictions against mixed-motive employment
actions,108 but the Court in Nassar held that the placement of the provisions
and the wording indicated that the restriction did not apply to Title VII
retaliation claims.109 However, to accept that the definition of “because”
found in other sections of Title VII somehow lacks a clear definition after
Price Waterhouse would be to limit the effect of a Supreme Court ruling to
the narrowest scope. If the definition ascribed to “because” in Price
Waterhouse was so limited to the point that it was inapplicable even to other
100.
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appearances in the same statutory scheme, then the power of the Supreme
Court, and its ability to provide meaningful guidance to lower courts, is
diminished. Furthermore, if the Nassar Court adopted this understanding of
the applicability of the Price Waterhouse Court’s ruling, it would have
simultaneously accepted such a neutered force and effect of its own ruling.
On the other hand, if the Nassar Court accepted the applicability of the
Price Waterhouse Court’s definition, at least extending it to other
appearances in the same statutory scheme, then the Nassar Court was
overturning the previous decision in its ruling by expressly substituting a new
causation framework. The Court attempted to sidestep the issue of overruling
Price Waterhouse by noting that the codification of Price Waterhouse in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a deliberate action that meant to exclude all
sections apart from the status-based discrimination section.110
It seems the Court was trying to indicate that the legislature was
impliedly limiting the effect of Price Waterhouse to these status-based
claims, but the Court also identified those legislative actions as “reject[ing]
it to a substantial degree.”111 The conclusion the Court comes to in this
instance is counterintuitive once again, because if the Court accepted the
applicability of the Price Waterhouse Court’s definition in the very least
across the same statute, then the Court should have necessarily viewed the
legislature’s action as reinforcing the causation framework without
restriction in other areas of the same statutory scheme.
If the legislature only limited aspects of the Price Waterhouse ruling in
its codification, under the same legislative intent analysis advocated by the
Nassar Court, it would imply that the legislature intentionally remained silent
only in limiting the causation framework in the remainder of the statutory
scheme.
Clearly, the Price Waterhouse decision controlled questions of
causation under Title VII after the decision.112 If the legislature passed laws
that expressly codified the Price Waterhouse causation framework for statusbased discrimination under Title VII, but did not expressly extend that
framework to other areas of Title VII, then the silence on those other areas
should not constitute a legislative reversal of a Supreme Court ruling.
However, if the legislature codified certain aspects of the Price Waterhouse
ruling and expressly limited aspects of it in relation to status-based
discrimination under Title VII, but remained silent regarding these
limitations for other adverse employment actions under Title VII, then the
silence on those other areas should constitute an intention to maintain the
unfettered applicability of the Price Waterhouse ruling for those other areas.

110. Id. at 2529.
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So it appears the Nassar Court must accept either the limited scope of
the force and effect behind its own decision or it must recognize that its
decision overturned the ruling in Price Waterhouse, which the legislature
expressly approved in relation to status-based claims and impliedly in
relation to all other Title VII claims, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
B. The Decision in Nassar Created an Impractical Framework for Title VII
Claims
In Gross, the Court characterized the causation and burden-shifting
framework from Price Waterhouse as difficult to apply.113 But, in adopting
a different causation framework for Title VII retaliation claims, while the
statutorily mandated burden-shifting framework for status-based claims
remains in effect, the resultant guidance for lower courts is now anything but
practical.114 The consequences are even more visible in the context of a
mixed claim under Title VII, which includes both a status based claim and a
retaliation claim.115 Furthermore, the different causation frameworks
effectively create a caveat for the protections provided under Title VII, and a
disincentive now exists for participating in any of the actions protected from
retaliation.
In Gross, the Court discussed the difficulty in providing clear
instructions to juries in the context of a burden-shifting framework.116 The
difficulties have often led to judgments notwithstanding the verdict when the
jury did not apply the framework properly.117 In that case, the Court chose
to go a different route in order to avoid the identified problems in ADEA
claims.118
However, in Nassar, the Court’s decision to avoid the burden-shifting
framework for one type of claim under Title VII, while it remains applicable
to status-based claims under the same statutory scheme, “is a complicated
concept to convey to juries” and it “is virtually certain to sow confusion.”119
This is most clear in the context of a Title VII claim consisting of both statusbased discrimination claims and retaliation claims.120
On the status-based portion of a combined Title VII claim, the plaintiff
would need to show direct evidence of discrimination, and then the employer
would need to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employment decision would have been made regardless of improper
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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motives.121 But on the retaliation portion of the claim, the plaintiff would
need to demonstrate that the adverse action would not have happened at all
in the absence of improper motives stemming from the plaintiff’s protected
actions.122
Once again, the majority in Gross based its decision on a policy
argument,123 and the majority in Nassar, consisting of the same Justices,
contradicted the previously adopted policy in its decision.124 Favoring
uniform applications across a statutory scheme is either appropriate or not.
However, the inconsistent behavior of the Court in promoting this concept in
an erratic fashion is certainly inappropriate.
The interdependence of anti-discrimination statutes and anti-retaliation
statutes is a fundamental relationship that is inherently necessary in order to
effectuate the underlying purpose of promoting equality.125 Enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws is only possible if individuals are free to participate
in the actions that bring discrimination to light, without the threat of
retaliation looming overhead.126 And additionally, the two claims are
frequently brought in the same action.127
The difference in causation frameworks causes a lack of protection for
employees in certain circumstances, and it also creates an uncertainty and
disincentive for involvement in the protected actions under the antiretaliation provisions.
With a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs in retaliation claims under
Title VII, it is conceivable that an individual may prevail, at least in part, on
a status-based claim and fail on a retaliation claim, even when both actions
are based on the same discrimination-based motivations. Additionally, other
employees, possessing knowledge of relevant details, may be dissuaded from
assisting in coworkers’ claims, understanding Nassar diminished their
protection.
Without the same level of protection for retaliation claims, participants
in status-based discrimination claims or investigations could be subjected to
adverse actions, and those participants would have a higher burden of proof
in establishing a claim than the original plaintiff, whom they attempted to
assist. In this way, an employee’s recourse would be restricted in multiple
ways. It would be restricted by the increased burden of proof in that
employee’s own Title VII retaliation claim, and by the dissuasion of other
coworkers to participate in Title VII claims for fear of retaliation.
121.
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Another undesirable consequence is found in the case at hand. Dr.
Nassar complained of discrimination, and instead of filing a claim, he opted
to remove himself from the situation.128 When the defendant responded
through retaliatory actions, Dr. Nassar filed a claim.129 Prior to the decision
in Nassar, Dr. Nassar would have been equally protected, with the same
burden of proof in filing a claim for status-based discrimination or
retaliation.130 In the aftermath, a plaintiff loses protection upon making a
complaint and removing himself from a hostile environment.131
The Court argued that a heightened burden of proof could minimize
frivolous lawsuits based on workplace harassment.132 But, the case at hand
indicates a different incentive structure. The Court’s decision does not
promote peaceable separation in situations of workplace discrimination.
Instead, an employee is better off filing a status-based discrimination claim
under Title VII with a lessened burden of proof than leaving the place of
employment, crossing his fingers, and hoping adverse actions will not follow
him.
Incentivizing status-based claims in comparison to retaliation claims
should prove to provide contradictory results to the predictions of the
Court.133 Fewer people will leave hostile environments peaceably without
seeking legal protection. Knowing the Nassar decision minimizes retaliation
protections, the victims of discrimination will be more likely to file timely
claims, before adverse retaliation actions stemming from workplace
discrimination complaints cloud the issues. Alternatively, and equally
undesirable, is the possibility employees will remain in hostile environments
without complaining of discrimination, waiting for the discrimination to
manifest in an adverse employment action.
The resultant statutory scheme under Nassar indicates a caveat of
protection exists. An employer is restricted from taking adverse employment
actions involving a combination of legitimate motives and illegitimate statusbased discriminatory motives, unless the employer can show the action
would have occurred in the absence of the illegitimate motives.134 However,
an employer is restricted from taking retaliatory adverse employment actions
only in situations where the employer has no other motivations for the
adverse action.135 This means discriminatory motives may play a major role
in a retaliatory, adverse employment action, as long as there are other
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motivations involved.136 Or, in other words, if multiple forces exist, each
being sufficient to cause a result, one cannot identify a but-for cause.137
However as the scenario is characterized, it does not sit well to
formulate potential situations in which Nassar’s resultant framework will
affect victims of discrimination. Where the line is cloudy between legitimate
and illegitimate motives, it is inappropriate to demand a victim reach into the
mind of his tormentor, and weigh the effect of an intangible factor to which
he does not have unfettered access.
At the point when a plaintiff has demonstrated an evidentiary basis for
a Title VII claim, that plaintiff “ha[s] taken [the] proof as far as it could
go.”138 To allow a defendant to defeat that proof by merely presenting a
facially valid, potential alternative motivation would be equivalent to
denying the very purpose of Title VII.139 This is especially true in situations
where the other party has substantially disproportionate access to the facts.140
In essence, the Court’s decision in Nassar serves to complicate the
resolution of Title VII claims containing both status-based and retaliation
claims. It also diminishes the protections provided by Title VII, and in so
doing, the decision is likely to result in more status-based discrimination
claims under Title VII, as any employee experiencing discrimination is better
served filing a claim prior to retaliatory actions, because peaceable
separations effectively expose employees to vulnerabilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the Court decided Nassar, it applied the reasoning from Gross,
and it did so according to an analysis it rejected in Gross. The Court also
relied on faulty logic in its interpretation of the legislative intent behind the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The resulting causation framework it decided to
apply to retaliation claims under Title VII undermines the fundamental
purpose of protecting employees from discrimination. Even in a vacuum, the
decision would have compromised protections from discrimination, but
considering the precedent, the existing statutory framework for status-based
discrimination claims under Title VII, and the inevitable confusion the
decision will produce in mixed-claim jury instructions, the decision was
inappropriate.
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